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Abstract 
In this article three models of firms interaction on the market are described. 
One of these models is described by using a differential equation and by 
Lotka-Volterra model, where the equation has a different form. Also, there are 
models of non-competing and competing firms. The article presents an 
algorithm for solving the interaction of competing firms in taxation and the 
calculation of a compromise point. Besides, the article presents a compromise 
between the interests of a state and an enterprise. 
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dynamic model, market. 
1 Introduction. 
In this article dynamic model of competitive interaction of firms on the market 
with taxation is explored. Any enterprise such as any state has the same goal 
- to generate income. The company wants to get as much income as possible 
in the form of profit, and the goal of a state is to get as much income as 
possible through taxation of enterprises, institutions and organizations. It is 
not profitable for an enterprise to give part of its profit to the state, therefore, 
it reduces its income. But it is beneficial for the state to receive all the profit 
from the enterprise. For a normal existence, both of enterprise and states must 
seek a compromise. If the state takes all the profits from the enterprise, the 
enterprise will cease to exist. The funds that the company gives to the state in 
the form of tax, the state spends in favor of the same enterprise. The state 
establishes the rules in force on the market in this country, conducts anti-
monopoly policy to maintain healthy competition on the market and protects 
the interests of domestic producers. All in all, the state guarantees the 
enterprise protection in case of violation of its legitimate interests by other 
market participants by the rules, which maintains competition on the market. 
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Many ideas that are used in this work are taken from [1]-[57] 
 
2 Literature Review.  
The following books are corresponded to the topic of a dynamic model of 
competitive interaction of firms on the market with taxation: the book 
Malafeyev's and Muraviev's books present some models, conflict situations 
and their resolution, which is related to this article. In the book of Christofides 
N., ''Graph Theory'', we can learn an algorithmic approach to competitive 
interaction. These list of books: "Game-theoretic model of two firms entering 
to the Cournot market'', ''Model of parallel computation'', ''Workshop on 
Computational Physics’’ helps us to deepen in the issue. The book “Corruption 
dynamics model”, Malafeyev O., Saifullina D., Ivaniukovich G., Marakhov V., 
Zaytseva I. is served as the theoretical basis for writing this article.  
2.1 Informal statement of the problem. 
Three models are presented in this article. In the first model, the two firms 
produce homogeneous goods and do not compete with each other. The 
second model generalizes the first, but in the second model, firms are 
competing with each other on the market. The third model is a model of 
competitive interaction between firms on the market and of the state, that 
influences their interaction through taxation. Any product has a double 
product. Products may vary in design, price and other parameters; by the way 
the manufacturer’s firm (or the seller’s firm) puts up for sale (positions) the 
goods; but the main purpose of the acquisition of goods is to be unchanged.  
Let firms produce homogeneous goods. Then the rate of growth of the firm’s 
capital  depends on the volume of demand for the goods, produced by this 
firm, also, on the volume of demand for the alternate product, produced by a 
competing firm, and on the total volume of demand. 
Further, the existence and uniqueness of the solution of this differential 
equation will be shown. We study the solution by analogy with Lotka-Volterra 
model. 
𝑉1 is the capital of the first firm, and 𝑉2 is the capital of the second firm 𝑝1, 𝑝2 
- total demand for goods, these coefficients set the rate of growth of capital of 
firms. 
𝑘1, 𝑘2 - coefficients that simulate the process of saturation of demand, which 
goods produced by the first and the second firms. 
We obtain equations that show the growth rates of capital of the first and the 
second firms. 
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The first equation in the system (1) 𝑘1𝑉1 is a factor that simulates the saturation 
of demand at the expense of the goods produced by  the first firm. 𝑘2𝑉2 is a 
term that simulates the saturation of demand by counteracting the competing 
firm. In the second equation the 𝑘2𝑉2 system is a factor that simulates the 
saturation of demand at the expense of the goods produced by the second 
company and 𝑘1𝑉1 is a term that simulates the saturation of demand at the 
expense of goods produced by a competing company. 
𝑘1𝑘2 - coefficients model how the demand is met with interchangeable goods 
at the expense of competitors. Equations (1) - Volterra equations, describe 
the competition model of two firms producing interchangeable goods. 
 
3 Analysis of the differential equation solution of the 
model of interaction between two firms. 
 
This system can be rewritten as (1 '):  
 
 
We study the solution of this system with initial data 𝑉1
0,  𝑉2
0, positive for 𝑡 =
𝑡0  
It can be shown that for any finite time interval (𝑡0, T), there is a unique solution 
of two continuous functions between two positive numbers, which depends on 
the end of the interval T (i.e., 𝑉1 and 𝑉2 are bounded) . 
Consider what happens with an unlimited increase in time. 
 
We get 
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then,  
 
We can say that,  
 
         if  
 
                 
 We get 
 
So, the value of the capital of the second company, in which 𝑝𝑘 is less 
important, the demand for the goods of this company is fully satisfied. It 
decreases and with time the second company loses all its capital, while the 
first company continues to exist. When a firm really loses all its capital, it is 
extremely rare situation. The owner of the company understands that the 
costs of the production and promotion of goods exceed the income from its 
sale, and take any steps to solve. 
3.1 The case of non-competing firms. 
If the second and the first firms exists on the market independently of each 
other, after large period of time the capital of the first firm obeys to the law. 
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Starting from the moment 𝑡1, when 𝑉1 takes the value 𝑉1
′.                                                 
Let’s say 𝑉𝑡
𝑙 is the root of the   equation. 
                                                                           (3) 
 
If 𝑉1
′ <  𝑉2
′, the term (3), starting from the moment,  will increase to      the 
value  𝑉𝑡
𝑙   following the law. 
 
As was considered, that 𝐹𝑉1
′  ≥  0, in neighbourhood 𝑉1
𝑙 for 𝑉𝑙
1 < 𝑉1
𝑙  turns out  
 
      by 
 
    
where φ is positive, it means that  
 
It can be concluded,  that 𝑉1 will never reach 𝑉1
𝑙, but any lower value can be 
achieved in a finite time. 
 
3.2 The case of competing firms. 
 
Consider a situation where two firms producing homogeneous goods compete 
with each other on the market 
If we take for the function F as a first approximation 
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where 𝜆1  >  0, 𝜆2 >  0, 𝑉1starting at time 𝑡1, it changes according to the law 
 
 
 
If 𝑉1 = 𝑉1
′, we can have 
 
 
As   
 
 
 
We obtain  
 
 
 
From here,  
 
 
 
 
 
Solving this equation, we obtain this. 
 
 
If the capital of the first firm has a finite redistribution, different from zero, then 
the second firm ceases to exist. 
 
This does not always mean the bankruptcy of the company. In nowadays 
companies have not one, but companies have several areas of activity. 
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The management of the company, which has only one line of business, may 
not bring the case to bankruptcy, but simply makes a decision to liquidate the 
company, the line of business, or change the product being produced for the 
better. 
A company with several fields of activity has the same choice - to close 
unprofitable production, or to change a product, or to organize a more 
successful promotion of this product on the market; but it is much easier for a 
large company to implement any of these measures, since it is financially more 
stable and has the money that it can invest in the above measures. Based on 
the above, we calculate the total income of firms competing with each other 
on the market for a finite period of time without taxation: 
 
Where, 
/ 
𝑉1
0 −first company capital value, 𝑉2
0 - second company capital value. 
 
4 Study based on Lotka Volterra model. 
When we neglect the case in which the firm itself saturates the market with its 
goods, the demand for goods produced by the firm is reduced only by the 
products of a competing firm. Then equation (1) has the form: 
                      (4) 
So, from system (4), we can write out three solutions to this system: 
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If the values of 𝑉1 or 𝑉2 are equal to zero at any given time, then they remain 
equal to zero in the future. This means that if the capital of the first firm or the 
capital of the second firm is zero, then there will be no change. The first 
solution corresponds to the origin, the second solution corresponds to the half-
axis 𝑉2> 0, the third solution corresponds to the half-axis 𝑉1> 0, and they form 
the boundary of the positive orthant     
     
   By virtue of the non-negativity of the quantities 𝑉1, 𝑉2, system (4) can be 
considered on the set 𝑅+
2 . This set is invariant in the sense that any solution 
starting with 𝑅+
2  does not leave it with the passage of time. As already 
mentioned, the boundary 𝑏𝑑𝑅+
2   of the set 𝑅+
2  is an invariant set. Since the 
trajectories do not intersect each other, the inner part of the set 
 
is an invariant set too. 
By virtue of the type of system (4), there exists a unique equilibrium position 
belonging to the notation F (𝑉1, 𝑉2) must satisfy the set 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑅+
2 . next it is clear 
that the position are: 
 
 
Multiplying the first equation of system (4) by the term 𝑝2  −  𝑘1𝑉1, the second 
equation by the term 𝑝2  −  𝑘2𝑉2 and adding them, we get
 
then,  
 
and  
 
 
Equation (5) can be written as: 
 
The function X defined by system (4) and remains constant on solutions of 
constant motion. As the functions H and G are 
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Then the function X (𝑉1, 𝑉2) reaches its maximum at the point F = (x, y). Level 
lines by ty curves (𝑉1, 𝑉2) ∈ around the point 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑅2
+ Solutions: X (𝑉1, 𝑉2) = 
should const be closed - remain on the level lines and return to the starting 
point. The solutions of system (4) are periodic. The process of interaction 
between two competing firms on the market described by the system of 
differential equations (4) is periodic in nature. The amount of capital of the first 
and the second firms are fluctuate, and the amplitude and frequency of these 
fluctuations are determined by the initial conditions. However, the time-
averaged values of 𝑉1, 𝑉2, are denoting the volume of stock and the number 
of enterprises, is constant and equal to the values to the equilibrium position: 
 
 
 
where T is the period of oscillation.  Integrating the term 
 
then, 
 
or 
 
If 𝑉1(𝑇)  = 𝑉1(0), it becomes 
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5 Case of competitive interaction firms under taxation. 
There are cases when the state taxes corporate incomes. Let 𝑈1 be the value 
of tax levied by the state from the first firm. 𝑈2 is the amount of tax paid by the 
second firm to the state. Then the corresponding equations of dynamics looks 
as follows. 
     
 (6) 
 
If the state taxes the income of the company and the tax is a percentage of 
the income, we have to fix the share of capital that is taxable per unit of time. 
U = xV, where 𝑥 ∈ (0,1) 
    
Then we obtain differential equations that show the growth rate of capital of 
competing firms in taxation: 
 
    (7) 
The problem arises by the time T to calculate the total income consisting of 
the capital of the first firm, the capital of the second firm and the state's income.
 
 
Solving the system of equations (7). We can get 
 
where, 
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Let’s calculate the total income for a finite period of time. 
 
 
 
 
Our task is to find a compromise between competing firms and the state. 
Let’s describe the algorithm for finding it. 
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5.1 Solution Algorithm 
We can describe the algorithm for finding a compromise point. 
 STEP 1: Calculate the income of the state and each company for a finite 
period of time.       
 STEP 2: For the state and each company we find the maximum income Ci.
 STEP 3: Find for the state and each firm a deviation from the maximum (Ci) 
for the remaining income functions.    
 STEP 4: From the deviations found for the state and each company, we 
choose the maximum. 
STEP 5: Choose the minimum of these maximum deviations, then the tax rate 
in which this minimum is reached and is a compromise for the state and 
competing firms. 
 
5.2 Calculation of a compromise point. 
 
Calculate the income of the state and each company for a finite period of 
time. 
 
If, 
 
 
   income of the first company for a finite period of time. 
 
 
 
income of the second company for a finite period of time. 
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state income derived from the collection of taxes for a finite period of time. For 
the state and each company we find the maximum income i. Firms  gets the 
maximum profit with minimum taxation, i.e. when their income is not taxed, it 
happens at x = 0 
 
The state receives the maximum profit at maximum taxation, i.e. with x = 1 
 
 Let’s find the deviation from the maximum of the other income functions for 
the first company: 
 
 Let’s find the deviation from the maximum of the other income functions for 
the second company: 
 
 
 
Then, we find the deviation from the maximum of the other functions of income 
for the state: 
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Let’s find  the maximum deviation for each agent: 
 
 
Our goal is to find a compromise point, therefore, we need to choose the 
minimum of these maximum deviations, and the point at which this is achieved 
is a compromise for the state and competing firms. 
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